Practically
forgotten for a few decades, the idea of neutrality – embedded in the debates
about the “Finland-option” and the ”Austrian model” – made a comeback especially
in connection with the escalation of the Ukrainian question in the spring of
2014.The chapter charts the Finnish and Austrian
reactions and responses to the increased international (western) interest in
these countries’ Cold War neutrality as a possible model for Ukraine and examines
the key differences. In Finland, reactions to the talks on a possible
Finland-option varied from evasive to negative. In Austria, the idea of an Austrian
model of neutrality for Ukraine was self-initiated and found domestic political
support in 2014. What do the differences tell about Finland’s and Austria’s Cold
War neutrality and about these countries’ relationship to the legacies of their
erstwhile Cold War neutrality? As possible lessons to be learned from their Cold
War neutrality, the attention is drawn to two aspects in particular: to the need
for a careful consideration of the nature of the institutionalization of
neutrality and the way in which neutrality would be embedded in the overall context
of the institutional commitments (international and/or bilateral) of an
aspirant neutral. Secondly, considering the Cold War experiences, in the most
successful neutral countries of the Cold War, neutrality was - and could be – made
use of as an instrument of state- and nation-building. Austria is a case of
success yet the case of Finland – exactly because of the fragility of its Cold
War neutrality – offers equally important lessons to be learned.