A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

Who Should Say on Pay and for the Sake of Whom in a Listed Company?




AuthorsAino Asplund

PublisherKluwer Law International

Publication year2015

JournalEuropean Company Law

Journal acronymECL

Volume12

Issue6

First page 286

Last page296

Number of pages11

ISSN1572-4999

Self-archived copy’s web addresshttps://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/2792720


Abstract

Listed companies' remuneration policies have been associated with bad corporate governance. It has been argued that managerial power is too strong, which leads to imbalance between pay and performance. As a solution, shareholders, possessing a special position in the mainstream theory, are increasingly empowered to say on pay. Because of the investors' high interest in short-term returns and the confusion the vote causes to the distribution of powers, the article challenges the feasibility of this shareholder primacy inspired action. In order for the company to contribute sustainable business, remuneration should be therefore built on companies' own long-term survival, not shareholder value, and supported with director primacy.


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Last updated on 2024-26-11 at 22:34