A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

Temporal Experiences without the Specious Present




AuthorsArstila Valtteri

PublisherTaylor & Francis

Publication year2018

JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy

Volume96

Issue2

First page 287

Last page302

Number of pages16

ISSN0004-8402

eISSN1471-6828

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1337211


Abstract

Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the notion of a specious present. Furthermore, I argue that the different aspects of temporal experiences arise from different mechanisms operating separately. If the theory is true, then temporal experiences do not tell us anything special about the nature of consciousness and its temporal properties per se.



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