A1 Vertaisarvioitu alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä lehdessä
The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals Requires No Restrictions
Tekijät: Maunu Ari
Kustantaja: Springer
Julkaisuvuosi: 2019
Journal: Synthese
Vuosikerta: 196
Numero: 1
Aloitussivu: 239
Lopetussivu: 246
Sivujen määrä: 8
ISSN: 0039-7857
eISSN: 1573-0964
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1468-y
Verkko-osoite: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1468-y
Rinnakkaistallenteen osoite: https://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/27687331
There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (PInI), or the thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument, PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity ("necessarily, a thing is identical with itself") to reach the conclusion a=b → □a=b, which is held to be paradoxical and, thus, fatal to PInI (in its universal, unrestricted form). My purpose is to show that the argument in question does not have this consequence. Further, I argue that PInI is a universally valid principle which can be used to prove the necessity of identity (which in fact is how the argument in question is usually employed).
Ladattava julkaisu This is an electronic reprint of the original article. |