A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems




AuthorsImai H, Salonen H

PublisherSPRINGER HEIDELBERG

Publication year2012

JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory

Journal name in sourceINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY

Journal acronymINT J GAME THEORY

Volume41

Issue3

First page 603

Last page622

Number of pages20

ISSN0020-7276

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0306-6


Abstract
We investigate a two-person random proposer bargaining game with a deadline. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the deadline is kept fixed. This limit is close to the discrete Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the deadline goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution. Regarding this limit as a bargaining solution under deadline, we provide an axiomatic characterization.



Last updated on 2024-26-11 at 21:46