The objective of this paper is to check measures for explanatory power of central bank

independence (CBI) in a series of econometric tests. Measures of central bank autonomy offer

a useful expression of the extent to which a central bank is able to keep the government away

from influencing a change in the inflation rate. The more a measure represents this idea, the easier

one can find a relation between the CBI value and the inflation rate. Results of estimations

show that proxies by Grilli et al. (1991) are strong regressors of inflation rate, contrary to those

by Cukierman et al. (1992). Moreover, estimation results challenge the belief that divergences

in CBI-inflation rate estimations are due to differences in institutional features across samples

of countries, not to differences in legal proxies of central bank independence. Already results

from a homogenous group of industrial countries indicate that some indices perform “better”

than others.