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All deceptions are not alike: Bayesian mechanism design with a social norm against lying
Tekijät: Korpela Ville
Kustantaja: J C B MOHR
Julkaisuvuosi: 2017
Journal: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Tietokannassa oleva lehden nimi: JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
Lehden akronyymi: J INST THEOR ECON
Vuosikerta: 173
Numero: 2
Aloitussivu: 376
Lopetussivu: 393
Sivujen määrä: 18
ISSN: 0932-4569
eISSN: 1614-0559
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616X14689075188007
Tiivistelmä
We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents try to avoid getting caught lying. We show that if this is the case, and it usually is, then Bayesian monotonicity is no longer a constraint in implementation and all incentive-compatible social-choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the previous literature, our result does not rely on any kind of intrinsic lying aversion, on which the experimental evidence ismixed.
We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents try to avoid getting caught lying. We show that if this is the case, and it usually is, then Bayesian monotonicity is no longer a constraint in implementation and all incentive-compatible social-choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the previous literature, our result does not rely on any kind of intrinsic lying aversion, on which the experimental evidence ismixed.
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