A1 Vertaisarvioitu alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä lehdessä

Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: differences between banks




TekijätJuha-Pekka Niinimäki

Julkaisuvuosi2015

JournalAUCO Czech Economic Review

Vuosikerta9

Numero2

Aloitussivu88

Lopetussivu104

eISSN1805-9406


Tiivistelmä

This paper studies asymmetric information on banks, relationship lending and switching costs. According to classic theory of relationship banking asymmetric information on borrower types causes an informational lock-in by borrowers: good borrowers are tied to their banks. This paper shows that an informational lock-in effect occurs even if borrowers are identical. Asymmetric information on banks generates an informational lock-in for borrowers. A borrower is tied to the initial bank even if it charges higher loan interest. The borrower is not ready to leave the bank and take a risk that the new bank proves to be even worse.




Last updated on 2024-26-11 at 21:46