A3 Refereed book chapter or chapter in a compilation book
Making Sense of Intransitivity, Incompleteness and Discontinuity of Preferences
Authors: Nurmi, Hannu
Editors: Pascale Zaraté, Gregory E. Kersten, Jorge E. Hernández
Publishing place: Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London
Publication year: 2014
Book title : Group Decision and Negotiation: A Process-Oriented View
Series title: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing
Number in series: 180
First page : 184
Last page: 192
Number of pages: 9
ISBN: 978-3-319-07178-7
eISBN: 978-3-319-07179-4
ISSN: 1865-1348
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07179-4(external)
The starting point of modern social choice theory is the assumption that the individuals are endowed with complete and transitive preferences over the set of alternatives. Over the past 60 years a steady flow of experimental results has suggested that people tend to deviate from principles of choice stemming from the utility maximization theory. Especially in choices under risk, this behaviour makes intuitive sense. The usual culprit, i.e. the source of this "deviant" behaviour, is most often found in the violation of transitivity or - under risk - of the monotonicity in prizes principle. We show that there are grounds for arguing that even the completeness principle as well as continuity of preferences may, quite plausibly, be violated.
Downloadable publication This is an electronic reprint of the original article. |  |
