A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä
Procedurally fair implementation under complete information




Julkaisun tekijät: Ville Korpela
Kustantaja: Elsevier
Julkaisuvuosi: 2018
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Tietokannassa oleva lehden nimi: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volyymi: 77
ISSN: 0304-4068
eISSN: 1873-1538

Tiivistelmä

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation
with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with
the path-braking result of Maskin (1999), and therefore, it allows us
to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are
implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the
constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the
collective.



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Last updated on 2019-29-01 at 16:36