A1 Journal article – refereed
Procedurally fair implementation under complete information




List of Authors: Ville Korpela
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2018
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal name in source: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume number: 77
ISSN: 0304-4068
eISSN: 1873-1538

Abstract

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation
with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with
the path-braking result of Maskin (1999), and therefore, it allows us
to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are
implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the
constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the
collective.



Internal Authors/Editors

Last updated on 2019-29-01 at 16:36