Refereed journal article or data article (A1)

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information




List of AuthorsVille Korpela

PublisherElsevier

Publication year2018

JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics

Journal name in sourceJournal of Mathematical Economics

Volume number77

Start page25

End page31

Number of pages7

ISSN0304-4068

eISSN1873-1538

DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001

URLhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001


Abstract

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation
with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with
the path-braking result of Maskin (1999), and therefore, it allows us
to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are
implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the
constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the
collective.


Last updated on 2021-24-06 at 11:12