A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä
Implementation without Rationality Assumptions

Julkaisun tekijät: Korpela Ville
Kustantaja: Springer
Julkaisuvuosi: 2012
Journal: Theory and Decision
Lehden akronyymi: Theory Dec
Numero sarjassa: 2
Volyymi: 72
Julkaisunumero: 2
ISSN: 0040-5833
eISSN: 1573-7187

Hurwicz (Social Choice and public decision making. Essays in honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986) was the first to study an approach to implementation theory based on choice functions instead of preference relations. We argue that the solution concept used by him, the generalized Nash equilibrium, is not really compatible with the idea that individual behavior is describable by a choice function. A new solution concept that better fits the choice function framework is then introduced. Using this, we investigate what behavioral assumptions are needed for the full characterizations of Nash implementable social choice correspondences to still hold. We will show that a condition known as Property α is central.

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Last updated on 2019-29-01 at 11:55