A1 Journal article – refereed
Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals




List of Authors: Ville Korpela

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication year: 2014
Journal: Social Choice and Welfare
Volume number: 43
Issue number: 3
Number of pages: 12
eISSN: 1432-217X

Abstract
We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154–169, 2012) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementation without any further restrictions if all individuals are partially honest. With common values, however, an additional assumption called private best alternatives is needed. This condition holds, for example, in most standard resource allocation problems


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Last updated on 2019-20-07 at 06:43