A1 Journal article – refereed
All deceptions are not alike: Bayesian mechanism design with a social norm against lying




List of Authors: Korpela Ville
Publisher: J C B MOHR
Publication year: 2017
Journal: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Journal name in source: JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
Journal acronym: J INST THEOR ECON
Volume number: 173
Issue number: 2
Number of pages: 18
ISSN: 0932-4569
eISSN: 1614-0559

Abstract
We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents try to avoid getting caught lying. We show that if this is the case, and it usually is, then Bayesian monotonicity is no longer a constraint in implementation and all incentive-compatible social-choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the previous literature, our result does not rely on any kind of intrinsic lying aversion, on which the experimental evidence ismixed.


Internal Authors/Editors

Last updated on 2019-29-01 at 22:00