A1 Journal article – refereed
A Dynkin game with asymmetric information




List of Authors: Jukka Lempa, Pekka Matomäki
Publication year: 2013
Journal: Stochastics: An International Journal of Probability and Stochastic Processes
Volume number: 85
Issue number: 5
Number of pages: 26

Abstract

We study a Dynkin game with asymmetric information. The game has a random expiry time, which is exponentially distributed and independent of the underlying process. The players have asymmetric information on the expiry time, namely only one of the players is able to observe its occurrence. We propose a set of conditions under which we solve the saddle point equilibrium and study the implications of the information asymmetry. Results are illustrated with an explicit example.



Internal Authors/Editors

Last updated on 2019-29-01 at 17:33