Abstract.  This paper expands the illustration and
analysis regarding the susceptibility of nine voting procedures to two types of
what are generally known as No-Show paradoxes. Following the article by
Felsenthal and Tideman (2013), the two paradoxes are denoted as P-TOP and P-BOT
paradoxes. According to the P-TOP paradox it is
possible that if candidate x has been elected by a given electorate
then, ceteris paribus, another candidate, y, may be elected if
additional voters join the electorate who rank x at the top of
their preference ordering. Similarly, according to the P-BOT paradox it is
possible that if candidate y has not been elected by a given
electorate then, ceteris paribus, y may be elected if additional
voters join the electorate who rank y at the bottom of their
preference ordering. Voting procedures that are susceptible to these paradoxes
are considered to be afflicted with a particularly serious defect because
instead of encouraging voters to participate in an election and vote according
to their true preference orderings, they may inhibit voters from participating
in an election and thereby undermine the rationale for conducting elections.