Title: Seeing Things Unreel – From Appearance to Apparition

1. Introduction

When I decided to pursue a PhD I opted to do something different from what I had done previously. In the past I had focused on language in politics through pragmatics, semantics and rhetoric. It would have been easier to carry on doing what I had already done in the past, but I chose otherwise as I wanted to broaden my horizons. It would have been a much safer choice to do more of the same, but that would have limited me into one familiar field.

What I chose to do instead was in part motivated by one of the last courses that I attended during my MA studies. That course focused on linguistic landscapes, a rather novel strand of sociolinguistics that emerged at the turn of the millennium. There were a number of options to choose from, but due to certain possible openings envisioned at the planning stages of my research I opted to focus on linguistic landscapes of education. Due to how events unfolded, I ended up focusing on a single landscape rather than multiple landscapes. As it turned out, choosing to do something different that is situated in the margins of different disciplines was detrimental to my funding. It seems that I kept transgressing established boundaries, never really fitting in any discipline.

The data gathering and annotation of my material proved to be rather clear cut, albeit particularly arduous. In other words, despite the initial intensiveness of it, I had little issues with the actual empirical fieldwork. The only practical problems that I encountered had to do with jurisdictional and bureaucratic matters. What I struggled with initially had to do with theory, something which, in retrospect, seems to be hardly addressed in much of linguistic landscape research. Therefore I will examine the theoretical aspects related to my work in this essay.

I begin this essay with an examination of theory in linguistic landscape research, followed by a similar examination of theory in geographic landscape research. These sections are dedicated to addressing existing theoretical limitations affecting much of linguistic landscape research while drawing parallels with pioneering landscape research of the early 1900s. I then move on from landscape theory to spatial theory as much of landscape research is grounded on certain philosophical foundations and a high

degree of familiarity in philosophy is typically expected of the reader. I examine the philosophical foundations in order to account for the pervasiveness of landscape, as presented in much of landscape research. Therefore the purpose of this essay is twofold. I address the existing theoretical limitations and attempt to explain the reader how I overcome the limitations in my own research.

2. Theory in linguistic landscape research

My own research is linked to the study of linguistic landscapes of education or schoolscapes, typically attributed to Brown (2005, 2012, 2018). Aligning her research to linguistic landscape studies (LLS), Brown (2012) refers to schoolscapes as the linguistic landscapes of educational spaces. Brown (2005, 79; 2012, 282; 2018, 12) defines the core concept as the school environment, the physical and social setting where written and spoken language procedurally (re)produce and alter language ideologies and the context in which the curriculum is implemented, socially supporting and officially sanctioning certain ideas and messages.

What is known as linguistic landscape research or LLS emerged in the early 2000s. The emergence of LLS is typically traced back to an article written by Landry & Bourhis (1997). In that article the concept of linguistic landscape is introduced and it is considered an important sociolinguistic factor. The article is often cited in LLS and therefore it is worth examining the definition of the concept Landry & Bourhis introduce as referring "*to the visibility and salience of language on public and commercial signs in a given territory or region*" (1997, 23 – emphasis in the original). Firstly, it is evident from this often cited definition that linguistic landscape (LL) is a visual concept involving language. Secondly, it is indicated that it is manifested on signs in a certain delimited area. In other words, LLS is the study of situated texts. Therefore the linguistic component pertains only to written language, assuming that language is understood strictly as only manifested in writing. More specifically, it pertains to texts put in place as opposed to texts that are not place or context specific. Landry & Bourhis (1997, 25) further elaborate the concept as "[t]he language of public road signs, advertising billboards, street names, place names, commercial shop signs, and public signs on government buildings combines to form the linguistic landscape of a given territory, region, or urban agglomeration."

The difference between the two definitions provided by Landry & Bourhis (1997) is in the fine details. The second definition is clearly more precise, offering concrete examples of the manifestations. It is evident that the object of inquiry is situated on static objects put on display in specific places in space. The problem with these definitions provided by Landry & Bourhis (1997) is that no justification or explanation is provided for the second component, the use of the word landscape. While contemporary LLS no longer make use of the definitions provided by Landry & Bourhis (1997) to a great extent, the earlier research can, however, be seen as influencing definitions in more recent studies as they also tend to ignore addressing the landscape component, or rather take it for granted. I found myself troubled by the lack of attention paid to the core concept that is landscape. If no one seems to be able to come up with a satisfactory definition of landscape in landscape research, how can linguistic landscape research make use of the word?

While it could be argued that focusing on the definition of landscape in linguistic landscape is merely an exercise in pedantry, the more I familiarized myself with landscape studies, the more I questioned taking the core concept for granted. In fact, I found myself deeply troubled by taking things for granted once I started to notice the parallels between the early geographic landscape studies and the early linguistic landscape studies. This can be exemplified by contrasting the pioneers of each research tradition, Sauer ([1925] 1929) and Landry & Bourhis (1997). Sauer characterizes the concept: "The term 'landscape' is proposed to denote the unit concept of geography, to characterize the peculiarly geographic association of facts. Equivalent terms in a sense are 'area' or 'region'" ([1925] 1929, 25). Sauer further elaborates the concept: "It may be defined, therefore, as an area made up of a distinct association of forms, both natural and cultural" ([1925] 1929, 25-26). It is evident that the definitions provided by Sauer ([1925] 1929) and Landry & Bourhis (1997) are very similar. In both cases landscape is equated to region and both are presented as studies of visible forms in a delimited area of land. The only notable difference between the two is in the specificity of the object of inquiry. LLS following Landry & Bourhis (1997) focus only on the study of visible forms of language in a delimited area, whereas landscape research as defined by Sauer ([1925] 1929) includes any and all visible forms, including but not limited to linguistic forms. As noted by Cosgrove, the problem with Sauer's ([1925] 1929) approach, also characterized as chorology, is that it results in "a static pattern or picture whose internal relations and constituent forms are understood, but which lacks process or change" (1985, 57). In other words, summarizing the criticism mounted against such approaches already decades ago, the

issue is that studies using such definitions yield inventories of items with little concern over how it all come to be and how it will change, not to mention why it is important in the first place.

Another pertinent issue is that neither Sauer ([1925] 1929) nor Landry & Bourhis (1997) provide a justification for using the word landscape. The problem for LLS is that due to the evident similarities with the definition provided by Sauer ([1925] 1929), those following Landry & Bourhis (1997) are open to the same effective criticism mounted against early landscape research by Hartshorne (1939). According to Hartshorne (1939), the issue is that without a justification for the use of the word landscape, there is little use for it. Moreover, as opposed to other concepts, such as area, territory or region, Hartshorne (1939, 344) is particularly concerned with obscurity of the concept. Summarizing Waibel (1933), Hartshorne (1939, 331) argues that it seems to be the case that landscape is preferred by some as it comes across as more impressive and imposing than the existing more precise alternatives. In more contemporary parlance, it could be argued that landscape has buzz value to it. In vitriolic opposition to the use of the word, Hartshorne goes as far as to argue that opting to use it as essentially synonymous with land, area or region is nothing "short of a scientific crime" (1939, 327). As noted by Hartshorne (1939, 327), the problem is that while there is no doubt that landscape has something to do with land, it is not synonymous to it, nor to area, territory or region which all refer to how land is delineated. It is worth noting, if not conceding, that contemporary criticism of research conducted nearly a century ago is without much grace or humility, having not only the benefit of hindsight but also the decades worth of subsequent research, significantly improved access to it and the technological improvements that benefit research. The problem for those following Landry & Bourhis (1997) is that such grace should hardly extend to contemporary studies. It does not bode well for them when it is evident that the present issues were recognized and addressed elsewhere nearly six decades before the publication of the article written by Landry & Bourhis (1997).

Linked to my own research, while the definitions of schoolscape provided by Brown (2005, 2012, 2018) take into account the dynamic nature of the educational spaces, not only what they are but also what they do, they still equate landscape to material environment. Laihonen & Tódor (2017) follow Brown (2012), but broaden the definition from linguistics to semiotics. Similarly to Laihonen & Tódor (2017), Szabó expands Brown's (2012) definition to include other modes of communication, but also reformulates it from physical environment to "visual and spatial organization of educational space"

(2015, 24). While both reformulations of schoolscape arguably improve upon it, not unlike most LLS very little discussion is offered on the use of core concepts: landscape and space.

3. Theory in landscape research

In order to address criticism mounted by Hartshorne (1939) against those who in their studies take landscape for granted and offer little justification for the use of the concepts, I opted to immerse myself in the existing literature on landscape. It quickly became apparent that there is no agreement on the concept of landscape and it remains rather enigmatic among landscape scholars. Moreover, as expressed by Schein (2003, 199), it is perhaps even unreasonable to expect that an agreement can be reached due to the variety of backgrounds and philosophical stances among those interested in landscapes. Lack of agreement does not, however, entail that the core concept can thus be altogether ignored. Schein argues that while focusing on the concept and its theoretical may seem "esoteric and arcane" (2003, 200), not to mention arduous, it is, nevertheless, a necessity. Duncan (1990, 11-12) is particularly adamant that ignoring theory and basing research solely on empiricism relies on uncontested assumptions and results in the exact opposite of claimed neutrality and objectivity. Duncan (1990, 11-12) is particularly critical of early landscape research of the early 1900s, namely Sauer ([1925] 1929) and his followers, due to the emphasis on rigorous fieldwork that entails unmediated observation and recording of landscape artifacts as data, which is then supposed to be revelatory. Ronai (1976, 137-139) argues that such rigorous analyses that equate landscape as the appearance of a geographic area result in the absence of landscape. Moreover, Ronai (1976, 153) refers to such passionate systematic empiricist approaches that seek to extract knowledge from landscapes as geophilia and adds that it results in reinforcing the existing representations of spaces, trapping the researchers in complicity and complacency and making landscape impervious to alteration. It is worth reiterating that much of the LLS build on a similar premise to that of the early landscape research, often following the definition provided by Landry & Bourhis (1997). Furthermore, as noted by Troyer & Szabó (2017, 56, 59), LLS tends to suffer from complacency, taking its most popular method, digital photography, very passionately, which may make the researchers complicit in reproducing representations, as noted by Ronai (1976, 153). It is worth noting that while there is a certain hostility towards empiricism in contemporary landscape research, as exemplified by Duncan (1990), it is only when there is an absence of theory. For example, despite any previous animosities and the apparent

shortcoming of lacking theory, Duncan & Duncan (2010, 227) commend Sauer ([1925] 1929) for taking data seriously, something that they consider lacking in contemporary landscape research. Therefore, as advocated by Duncan (1990, 15) and exemplified by, for example, Schein (1997, 2009), it is advisable to opt for a middle ground, taking both theory and practice seriously as I have attempted in my own research (Savela 2018).

Addressing landscape in relation to space, Ronai (1976, 126-127) argues that landscape does not exist by itself, nor is it an inherent part, fraction or aspect of space. Instead, for Ronai (1976, 126-127), it is performed or projected to space through gaze that reduces real space to spectacle of space. Similarly, Cosgrove (1985, 46) defines landscape as a way of seeing. It may seem absurd to state that such has any importance, yet, as elaborated by Cosgrove (1985, 46), landscape is a veritable invention, on one hand making use of the appeal of art and on the other hand the certainties of science, namely geometry that is typically regarded as an inherent property to space itself. Cosgrove (1985, 46) emphasizes the importance of the use of linear perspective in this development that can be traced to Renaissance Italy. Consequently, Cosgrove (1985, 55) argues that, landscape offers an observer a sense of control over the environment, one that is nonetheless illusory. Similarly Ronai (1977, 79-80) argues that landscape grants an observer a commanding view, a posture, that is, nevertheless, in actuality an illusion, a mere imposture. The result of this development is, as argued by Lewis (1979, 11), that for many landscape simply is, at best appraised for its aesthetic qualities as either beautiful or ugly, as noted by both Ronai (1976, 127) and Lewis (1979, 11). Ronai (1976, 127) argues that as a result landscape, a reduction of real space into a spectacle of space, creates an illusion of harmony, a simultaneity of aesthetic and anesthetic. In similar manner, Mitchell (2002, vii-viii) states that landscape functions as an invitation to look at not something but nothing, overlooking instead of looking, ignoring the particulars in favor of an irreducible totality. Therefore Mitchell argues that engagement with landscape is a matter of "conscious apperception of space" (2002, viii) rather than perception of space. Schein (1997, 663; 2003, 202-203) argues that ignoring the particulars in favor of the scene can result in landscapes becoming seemingly unproblematic, to an extent that people take them for granted, making them normative and central to production and reproduction of everyday life. Due to the taken for granted nature of landscape, Cresswell (2003, 277) identifies landscape as doxic, in reference to *doxa*, defined by Bourdieu ([1972] 1977, 164) as the common sense realm in which an arbitrary order of things is naturalized and appears self-evident, resulting in its reproduction according to its own logic.

Alternatively, in Foucault's ([1969] 1972, 25) parlance, landscape can be identified as the never-said, an incorporeal discourse, something already-said that has its origin no longer apparent. Following Derrida ([1967] 2005, 369-370), Rose (2006) provides an apt characterization of landscape as offering dreams of presence, a reassuring foundation or origin.

Mitchell (2002, vii) states that landscape offers a subtle and indirect mean of exercising power, making it hard to resist. Therefore Mitchell ([1994] 2002, 5) argues that landscape is a medium that, as also noted by Ronai (1976, 127), does not exist in itself, but lends itself to an infinite number of uses. It has had two principal uses, serving as a practical medium in appropriation of space, legitimizing land as property, as elaborated by Cosgrove (1985, 46), and serving states by linking it with codes of conduct, as explained by Matless (2000, 142), making it not only a matter of property but also of propriety, as noted by Wylie (2007, 117). In other words, as a medium landscape has been used to appropriate land as property while obscuring such development and to instill propriety, certain desired appropriateness, such as what a national identity entails.

4. Reformulating landscape theory

As I was not content on applying existing definitions offered for the concept uncritically and found myself puzzled by landscape no matter how many influential landscape studies I read, I decided to extend my reading from existing studies on landscapes and linguistic landscapes to other disciplines. I engaged in philosophy in order to understand how it is connected to space. Simply put, I kept being mesmerized by the importance attributed to landscape by scholars. It seemed very counterintuitive that a concept attributed to paintings has a profound impact on everyday life. Therefore I opted to dedicate my time to better understand what reality is and whether it can be accessed directly or merely indirectly, as well as how it is connected to perception and volition. It may seem to be a time consuming or simply unnecessary endeavor, but, on the contrary, it is arguably necessary to do so, otherwise one opts to ignore much of the pertinent criticism.

Crang & Thrift (2000, 1) state that space is everywhere in thought, a convenient and flexible nostrum that can be put into various uses. More emphatically, Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 2-4; [1986] 2003, 206) criticizes using space as a buzzword, parceled by different disciplines for different purposes, fitted to

suit the relevant methodological premises. Summarizing Lefebvre, the problem is that it is rarely explained what space is and how it is connected to everyday life, resulting in a "yawning gap" ([1974] 1991, 3-5) between how it is presented as mental space and how it is in practice. Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 4) argues that this is the result of the emphasis put on the *cogito*, the abstract rational subject. Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 1-6; [1986] 2003, 206) notes that it was once used intelligibly across disciplines, or in philosophy, but contemporarily space tends to be, at best, understood as Euclidian-Cartesian-Newtonian, as an empty zone or container that bears no effect upon its content, defined as absolute, optical and geometrical.

Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 26) is not content on merely criticizing others for using space axiomatically, i.e. assuming that the readers know what is meant by it. Therefore Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 33, 38-40) proposes an interconnected conceptual triad, consisting of spatial practice, representations of space and representational spaces and their phenomenological counterparts, perceived space, conceptualized space and lived space. The first part, spatial practice, pertains to how space is produced as well as perceived. The second part, representations of space, has to do with how space is conceptualized and represented, namely by various experts, including but not limited to planners, engineers, scientists and artists. Following Burke (1757, 29-30) and Plato (1888, 310-311), this includes landscape painters who in their works represent space, imitate reality. The third part, representational spaces, relates to how space is passively experienced, imagined in association to images and symbols, including representations of space, imitations of reality. Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 39) notes that the parts of the triad are in dialectical relationship or tension, making up social space. It is worth emphasizing that the parts do not function in opposition to one another, as pairs of affirmation-negation (thesis-antithesis) resulting in negation of negation (synthesis), but as simultaneous moments as noted by Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 40). In other words, none of the parts are synthesized from the other parts nor is space synthesized from only two parts at any given time. Shields (1999, 161) rephrases representations of space and spaces of representation as discourses *on* space and discourse *of* space respectively. Similarly to Lefebvre and likely influenced by him, Ronai (1976, 158-159), proposes a tripartite space, consisting of real space, knowledge of space and spectacle of space and their counterparts social practice, discourse and gaze. For Ronai (1976, 158) spectacle of space functions as a mediator between the two others with landscape positioned as its central feature.

I find Lefebvre ([1974] 1991) particularly useful to landscape scholars, including linguistic landscape scholars, as his triadic formulation of space helps to pinpoint landscape as a space of representation (discourse of space) without ignoring spatial practice and representations of space (discourses on space). In other words, Lefebvre ([1974] 1991) succeeds in explaining why space matters and why it should not be understood as a mere container bearing no relevance to what it contains. Nevertheless, as much as I have found Lefebvre's work useful in my own research, I find it lacking in terms of explaining why landscape is as pervasive as it is presented in landscape research. Having read Lefebvre ([1974] 1991), the concept still seemed incongruous and I was not convinced of the pervasiveness of landscapes as presented in much of the existing literature. Simply put, it seemed that the concept had to be more deeply rooted in our perception of reality. Therefore I opted to look elsewhere, eventually finding what I was looking for explained by Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987). However, as their ontology is highly unorthodox, simply outlandish, and highly complex it is useful to familiarize oneself with Deleuze's philosophy of difference before explaining landscape as defined by Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987).

In order to better understand philosophy of difference, it is, perhaps, best to start with Kant due to his influence on Deleuze. Following Kant ([1781/1787] 1998, A249-A250), objects can be distinguished as *phenomena* and *noumena*, how objects come to appear to us in reality and how they are in themselves. Opposed to transcendental realism in which space, time and the objects are things in themselves, given or a priori, this split is what Kant understands as transcendental idealism, objects appearing as "mere representations and not as things in themselves" ([1781/1787] 1998, A369), including space and time. In other words, following Kant, reality is approached via phenomena, via representations instead of reality itself as it is beyond direct access to us. Deleuze (1978) notes that in itself this split is not unique to Kant, but what it entails is. He argues that Kant does not use *phenomenon* defined as appearance but as apparition, something appearing or becoming sensible inasmuch it does, meaning that when it does it is not opposed to its essence, nor considered as either true or false. He clarifies that in his view Kant is a phenomenologist and thus the task is not to seek for essences behind appearances but to seek the conditions which result in something appearing to us. He warns that this does not mean, for Kant, that what appears to us is constituted by the subject. Instead, he emphasizes, the subject constitutes the conditions for apparition, in order for something to appear to the subject. This necessitates the subject to be transcendental instead of empirical as the conditions of apparition are tied to the subject. In

summary, Deleuze argues that for Kant there is a distinction between phenomena and noumena. What matters is the phenomena. However, Deleuze emphasizes that focusing on phenomena is not in the search of the noumena, the essence of phenomena, but in search of the conditions that render them apparent as phenomena.

Outside the phenomenological tradition following Husserl, Somers-Hall (2012) states both Hegel and Deleuze seek to address a common problematic which is present in Kant ([1781/1787] 1998). Summarizing Somers-Hall (2012), while it is evident that Kant's transcendental idealism addresses limitations of both empiricism and rationalism, the finite and the infinite, and the essence/appearance split, it nonetheless ignores what exists in the margins of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the representational and the non-representational. Somers-Hall (2012) notes that albeit distinct from one another, both Hegel ([1812-1816] 1989) and Deleuze ([1968] 1994) indicate that calculus is, in particular, in contradiction of Kant's transcendental idealism. Somers-Hall (2012, 162-165) summarizes that calculus is particularly problematic as it allows us to determine variable quantities, such as non-constant velocity, but they cannot be accurately represented, only approximated. More specifically, Somers-Hall (2012, 169) explains that for Hegel ([1812-1816] 1989, 253) the differential co-efficient dy/dx is determined but the terms in it have no meaning outside the ratio. Moreover, Somers-Hall (2012, 170-171) summarizes that for Hegel, contra Berkeley (1734), the intermediate state of the ratio, the unity of being and nothing, is not a state but a transition, a dialectic. While largely similar to Hegel, Somers-Hall (2012, 173) notes that Deleuze [1968] 1994) maintains that the differentials can be separated from the statement dy/dx. More specifically, Deleuze argues that "[t]he symbol *dx* appears as simultaneously undetermined, determinable and determination" ([1968] 1994, 171). In other words, the differentials themselves, *dy* and *dx*, are undetermined, but reciprocally determinable (*dy/dx*) and determined once the statement is put into use. Somers-Hall (2012, 173) elucidates that, contra Hegel, Deleuze argues that the differential is not undetermined because it is not real but because it is not intuitive or quantifiable. Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 171) refers to it as continuousness. Somers-Hall (2012, 174) emphasizes that determination of quantity is generated through the differential function, not the differentials themselves, which, for Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 178), are extra-propositional or sub-representative. Somers-Hall (2012, 177) summarizes that by applying the dialectic to differentials Hegel moves from the static to dynamic, from finite representation to infinite representation, whereas Deleuze locates the differentials outside representation as neither finite or infinite, yet involved in

generating representation as determinables. Commenting on Hegel, Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 43-44) characterizes Hegel's understanding as stuck in representation, letting the finite subsist in the infinite, taking it to its logical conclusion as restless, infinite and orgiastic representation. In summary, as noted by Somers-Hall (2012, 188, 242), in Deleuze's philosophy of difference, it is difference that gives rise to identity as representation comes from the non-representation, actuality from virtuality. In other words, Deleuze uses calculus to address the margins of representation, how something beyond it, undetermined, becomes determinable and determined. Moreover, he uses it to exemplify how difference is not between identities but gives rise to them. Therefore for Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 222) difference is not phenomenal but noumenal. To be specific, according to Deleuze difference is "the noumenon closest to phenomenon" ([1968] 1994, 222). This is what Deleuze refers to as transcendental empiricism, abandoning the privileged transcendental subject as formulated by Kant ([1781/1787] 1998) and locating the transcendental outside the subject, as elaborated by Somers-Hall (2012, 12-13). Simply put, consequently identity, including the subject, does not determine reality. Instead, difference determines identity, how everything comes to appear to us.

Kant's ([1781/1787] 1998) definition of space is among those criticized by Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 3-6) as it is neatly separated from knowledge and experience by being situated in the transcendental subject. Deleuze (1978) elaborates that for Kant space, as well as time, are immediate and intuitive. Moreover, he adds that as space and time are intuitive, they are presentational instead of representational, that is to say given or a priori, yet through intuition they appear to us. Therefore Kant designates them as "representations *a priori*" ([1781/1787] 1998, A373-A374). Deleuze (1978) emphasises that for Kant, contra, for example, Leibniz, time is not defined by succession, duration or coexistence, as they are its modes and that space is not defined in opposition or subordination to time as coextensive as that is a mode of time. Kant states that space is in us, by which he means "a receptivity for being affected" ([1781/1787] 1998, A370-A374, A494), which Deleuze (1978) characterizes as the form of exteriority, how things appear exterior to one another. Similarly to space, for Kant ([1781/1787] 1998, A373-A374, A494) time is in us, which Deleuze (1978) clarifies as a form of interiority, how one affects oneself. In summary, for Kant space and time are necessary forms of intuition as to how we experience the world. Dewsbury & Thrift thus aptly refer to this understanding of space as "Kant's filing system for observation" (2005, 89). Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 222-223) inverts the Kantian understanding of space, placing the world itself, the *noumenal*, outside the subject, classifying it by extensities, the divisible

quantities such as area and distance, and intensities, the qualities such as temperature and pressure which cannot be divided without a change in the quality itself. For Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 223) the two are inseparable or intertwined, intensities developing the sensible extensities. Moreover, as for reality or the real, for Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 208-209) it is both virtual and actual, constituting and constituted, relational and actual. Dewsbury & Thrift characterize space as defined by Deleuze as "the actual world" that "is made out of the virtual chaos of immanence" (2005, 89-90). This is what Guattari ([1992] 1995, 95) calls fractal ontology.

My understanding of landscape is aligned with a definition provided by Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987). However, in order to make sense of their definition, it is necessary to elaborate a number of concepts used by them. Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 66, 111) introduce regimes of signs which constitute semiotic systems consisting of form of content (discursive formation) and form of expression (non-discursive formation) in reciprocal presupposition. Firstly, Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 112-13) describe the signifying regime of signs as the regime in which each sign never refers to anything but another sign in a chain of signification, *ad infinitum*. Moreover, Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 114) describe it as marked by a profound deception, an arbitrary erection of certain signifiers as signifieds. Most importantly, however, Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 115) posit the face as its central icon, giving the signifier actual substance. Simply put, as described by Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 114-115) the signifying regime consists of a supreme leader, a despot-god, encircled by bureaucrats, the interpreter priests whose work is never done due to the infinite circularity of signification. Secondly, Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 119-123, 133-134) describe the postsignifying regime of signs as the regime marked by subjectification and passionality in which signs function in a linear fashion as a segmented line that is forever repudiated, never really leading anywhere. Thirdly, Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 130) state that contemporarily these regimes are mixed and the despots have been replaced by *cogito*, by being slave to pure reason, to oneself. Furthermore, Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 142, 167) state that located at the junction of these regimes is a special mechanism, the abstract machine of faciality, that functions as a structured structuring structure, not merely representing reality but in fact creating it. In other words, as an abstract machine it is responsible for the organization of the actualization of the virtual, as aptly summarized by Murray (2013, 16).

Following Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 167-172), I understand landscape as a facialized world, the correlate of the abstract machine of faciality. Therefore, following Deleuze & Guattari ([1980] 1987, 142), landscape is not a static representation of reality but an active construction of reality for the observer. In Foucauldian parlance, as elaborated by Massumi (1992, 17-18), an abstract machine is a de facto diagram, operating at the intersection of discursive and non-discursive formations, from which a literal diagram can be extracted in order to explain its functionality. Moreover, summarizing Massumi (1992, 17-18), landscape is not a thing-in-itself, but rather the process of making-world-into-landscape. Therefore, linking landscape to space, in Lefebvre's ([1974] 1991, 33, 38-40) and Ronai's (1976, 158) terms, landscape is a space of representation or a spectacle of space, an active reduction of real or material space to representation, as argued by Ronai (1977, 78), influenced by representations of space, as argued by Cosgrove (1985). Furthermore, due to its diagrammatic nature, it is possible to operationalize landscape as a medium, as explained by Mitchell ([1994] 2002, 5), in order to appropriate space, as explained by Cosgrove (1985), as well as to instill desirable proprieties, as explained by Matless (1998). Ronai (1976, 154-155) exemplifies the utility of landscape, arguing that it can utilized as the face of the nation by creating a harmonious link between its appearance, its beauty, and the excellence of the landforms. This is exactly what I am interested in in my own research on landscapes of education, examining how landscape is utilized to instill certain identities and proprieties on students.

While I consider it pivotal to address what landscape is and how it functions to construct reality that obscures particulars in favor of an aestheticized totality, I am equally, if not more interested in the obscured particulars. I follow Foucault's definition of discourse as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” ([1969/1971] 1972, 49) and Tuan's (1979, 89-90) notion of landscape as an ordering of reality, containing smaller units which by themselves are mere items, but, following Schein (1997, 2003, 2009), together provide information on the discourses materialized in the landscape. Schein (1997, 663) explains that while it is indeed possible to examine individual elements and identify the underlying discourses, it is the combined effect of materialized discourses that makes them hard to trace in everyday life. Therefore, as argued by Schein (2003, 200), landscape is functionally normative, prescribing how things and one ought to be. More specifically, following Foucault ([1975] 1995) and Schein (1997, 663), the materialized discourses, as manifested in the landscape, function to discipline people, to condition them to act and think in certain ways. The

disciplinary capabilities are further enhanced by how landscape functions as an apperceptive way of seeing, a gaze, making the observer take the scene and what is contained in it for granted, as argued by Schein (1997, 663). Therefore, as argued by Mitchell (2002, vii), it is the subtlety of landscape that makes it very hard to resist. This is exactly how I approach landscapes of education, examining the materialized discourses present in the landscape in order to show how certain identities and proprieties are instilled on students. For example, I examine the saliency of languages in a landscape of education and contrast the findings with official language and education policies in order to find out whether the dominant discourses are materialized in the landscape.

Based on my own theoretical understanding of landscape and space, I do not believe that my definition of landscape will satisfy everyone. Nevertheless, I am rather content on my understanding of the central concept, as well as confident on its definition. Landscape is clearly problematic due to its use value as a medium. It can be used, has been used and is used for purposes that may be counterproductive to the interests of the many. Therefore it is not at all clear that one would want to retain it, at least not as it is generally understood. However, while it may seem counterintuitive to retain it instead of favoring a non-representational definition, or otherwise advocating for the abandonment of the concept, it seems counterproductive to ignore its function in everyday life. Following Foucault ([1977] 1980, 131), ignoring or assuming that there is no landscape, as elaborated in this essay, would be ignoring the existing regimes of truth. In other words, the issue will not go away by itself. Ignorance towards landscape only reinforces it, considering that, paraphrasing Mitchell (2002, viii), it is a matter of ignorance in the first place. This is exactly why I dedicated much of my time trying to understand its genesis, function and importance in everyday life.

5. Conclusion

I dedicated this essay to the examination of theory or theories relevant to my own doctoral thesis research. In summary, as stated in the introduction, I had little issues with the data gathering and annotation. There has never been a lack of attention to detail in LLS as fieldwork is its a hallmark and this is also something that I have subscribed to in my own research. What I found lacking in LLS was theory of landscape. Moreover, I found it particularly problematic that the issue still largely persists despite efforts made to address the issue. It is arguably of utmost importance to not focus only on the

materiality of space, claiming neutrality and objectivity in the process, as, following Duncan (1990, 11-12), such relies on the assumption that unmediated observation of reality, the-thing-itself, is possible, resulting in the exact opposite of objectivity and neutrality. While it may seem “esoteric and arcane”, as noted by Schein (2003, 200), it is, nevertheless, a necessity to engage with theory. It is, of course, very arduous, if not tedious, to dedicate one's time to theory, wondering what is reality and how it functions, instead of opting for analysis, but if anyone is to take space and landscape seriously, it must be done. Opting not to do so, despite the apparent criticism, results in intellectual dishonesty, unwillingness to engage with one's own presumptions.

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